Indeed, when discussing the
1972 offensive, most VPA commentators (22) mentioned the signification role of US support
in limiting the successes enjoyed by the VPA. With nearly 900 aircraft, including 100
B52's the RVNAF and the USAF, any weaknesses in the VPA's anti- aircraft defenses were
reflected in troop and vehicle losses. By 1975, while the RVNAF's strength had increased
to over 1600 aircraft of all types, the VPA was able to establish a protective umbrella
over most troop concentrations, greatly reducing the incidence of AFV casualties from
either tactical bombing or close air support tasks.
While in 1968 and 1969, at the Lang Vei and Ben Het special forces camps, armor had
attacked with little cooperation with the infantry, by 1972, the VPA was obviously still
failing to digest the lessons needed from those battles and while fielding mixed armor and
infantry columns their experiences in attempting to capture the provincial capital of An
Loc, in the words of Kym Stacey, "clearly illustrated weaknesses in tactical
co-ordination and co-operation."(23) Indeed the lack of effective artillery support,
combined with an absence of accompanying infantry, meant armored vehicles became easy prey
to the anti-armor weapons of the ARVN forces.(24)
In 1972 though, the mid-intensity style of conflict which the VPA had been called upon
to conduct was a new and novel experience for it. In particular the commanders
lacked the background to organize large-scale, combined arms operations and this
deficiency was definitely reflected in high casualty rates amongst men and vehicles.
That the three fronts on which the VPA forces were fighting were uncoordinated and
failed to support one another aided their opponents in the ARVN and US forces to contain
the VPA drives. In particular, on the northern front, the VPA drive lost its initial
momentum due to the inability of the logistics system to maintain supplies to the fighting
units.(25) One commentator described the situation in these terms:
hesitant uncoordinated fumbling with some well-maintained Soviet vehicles showed once
again that successful armor employment is totally dependent on aggressive spirit and
technical skill on the part of the tank crews.(26)
By 1975 though, most of these problems had been corrected with all-arms cooperation
reaching a new high, with armor, infantry and artillery working closely together. Indeed
Stacey once more makes the point that the VPA most valuable lesson learnt from the 1972
offensive was that concentration of armor is the major key to its employment.(27) For the
VPA this meant abandoning its previous "penny-packetism" and deciding on what
were to be the most decisive battles and those which would have the greatest influence on
the prevailing strategic situation and employing armor there, rather than spreading it
broadly across the whole theatre of operations.
The VPA, according to Stacey, identified two main methods of successfully employing
armored forces - "sudden assault" and "deep advance".(28) "Sudden
assault" implied an overwhelming of enemy resistance by a quick attack. In this the
shock effect created by the AFV's was utilized to throw the enemy off balance and prevent
him from regaining his composure. This technique was used against population centers such
as Xuan Loc, Bien Hoa, Hoc Mon and ultimately Saigon. A successful "sudden
assault" opened the way for an effective "deep advance" or pursuit. The
vulnerability of a withdrawing enemy meant pursuing VPA forces were able to inflict heavy
casualties on ARVN units, as occurred during the retreat from the Highlands. In addition,
the "deep advance" made use of a tactic referred to as "blooming
lotus" by the VPA, in which units undertaking the breakthrough of the enemy's lines
would then spread out to exploit that breakthrough and hence cause the maximum damage
possible behind the enemy's defenses.
In order to maintain the momentum of their advance VPA commanders used the technique of
"leap-frogging" units. When enemy resistance was encountered the leading units
deployed for a quick assault while following units bypassed the enemy location to continue
the advance. This was the case with the attack on the Thu Duc Officers' School
outside of Saigon. While it was in progress, other VPA units pressed on to attack and
seize the Saigon Bridge, and hence opening the way into Saigon itself.(29)
The speed at which the VPA was able to maintain their advance, combined with a lack of
planning and preparation on the part of the ARVN forces opposing them, denied the latter
opportunities to regroup and consolidation. The ability of the VPA to sustain its progress
came from a well disciplined and well organized logistics system based upon more than
10,000 vehicles. To fully capitalize on the opportunities created by successful infantry
and armor attacks, VPA troops needed the ability to move at the same speed as the leading
armored vehicles. Where previously VPA divisions had moved entirely on foot, in this
offensive the available resources made it possible to mount them in trucks for rapid
redeployment. The VPA also made greater use of APC's (Armored Personal Carriers) for both
troop transport and the close accompaniment of tanks during assaults. By these various
methods, the VPA units were able to cover an average of 50 to 60 kilometers in a 24 hour
period.(30)
The general level of competence of VPA armor commanders also underwent a vast
improvement between the 1972 Easter Offensive and the 1975 Final Offensive. The VPA
established within combined arms groups a command situation where the senior infantry
officer was in charge, except where AFV's were performing the major attack task, where
instead, the senior armor officer was in charge. Training also stressed that to carry out
an effective tactical appreciation commanders needed to be in a position to observe
changes on the battlefield, while the implementation of any plan required commanders to
have firm control over all the forces under their command. This is, as pointed out by
Stacey, at odds with the normal beliefs expressed about Communist leadership training
which has often been criticized for stifling individual initiative, which has often led to
commanders being unable to cope with unexpected situations. Indeed, according to VPA
sources quoted by Stacey, such as Colonel Xuan's article on the 1975 Spring Offensive,(31)
the VPA's method of carrying out command tasks was to encourage flexibility and creativity
in all combat situations. This was to apply particularly to commanders of "deep
advance" columns. The successful bypassing of ARVN defensive locations to strike at
centers of command and control depended upon the personal initiative of individual
commanders.
What the VPA had learnt, primarily because of their experiences in 1972, according to
Stacey, was that if they ignored the basic considerations of AFV employment, high
casualties could result.(32) When examining the full experience of VPA armored
operations it is obvious that no new techniques or innovations occur in comparison with
their opponents in the US or allied armies. What is shown though, is that there are many
valuable lessons demonstrating how armored vehicles can be best employed in wartime.
Lessons which were ignored initially by the US Army and its allies, much to their
detriment and which the VPA was forced to learn the hard way through its failures in 1968,
1969 and 1972. What is interesting is that it took only 8 years approximately from the
first appearance of VPA armor on the battlefield to it becoming their major war-winning
weapon. Few armies have been able to produce the necessary evolution in command and
control to absorb and make use of the battlefield lessons which they have learnt the hard
way, in that sort of time frame, when making use of a weapon of which they have little or
no experience.
This article has attempted to provide only a quick overview of the way in which armor
was employed during the Vietnam War. In particular I felt it was important to try and
convey the conflicting opinions of how armor was used by the various combatants during the
war. I would recommend that the reader, if interested in following up the subject further,
refer to the bibliography below for more information.
______________________________
Bibliography
Dunstan, S., Vietnam Tracks, Arms & Armor Press, London, 1982.
Hopkins, R.N., Australian Armor; a history of the Royal Australian Armored Corps
1927-1972, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1978.
Royal Australian Armored Corps, An Illustrated Record of the Royal Australian Armored
Corps Tank Museum Puckapunyal, Victoria, 1977.
Stacey, K., 'Armor in Vietnam: the lessons of 1972 and 1975,' Defense Force Journal,
May/June 1980, No.22.
Stanton, S., The Rise and Fall of an American Army: US Ground Forces in Vietnam,
1965-1973, Spa Books, Stevenage, 1985.
Ulmer, W.F., `Notes on Enemy Armor at An Loc,' Armor, Jan- Feb.1973.
_____ _______________________
Endnotes
1) quoted, p.62, Dunstan, S., Vietnam Tracks, Arms and Armor Press, London, 1982.
2) p.56, Starry, D.A., Armored Combat in Vietnam, Blandford Press, Poole, 1981.
3) quoted, ibid.
4) p.57, ibid.
5) quoted, p.140, ibid.
6) p.251, Hopkins, R.N., Australia Armor: A History of the Royal Australian Armored
Corps, 1927-1972, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1978.
7) p.49,, Starry, D.A., Armored Combat in Vietnam.
8) ibid.
9) p.251, Stanton, S., Rise and Fall of an American Army, Spa Books, Stevenage, 1985.
10) p.59, Dunstan, S., Vietnam Tracks
11) p.46, Starry, D.A., Armored Combat in Vietnam.
12) p.5, Ward, I., `North Vietnam's Blitzkrieg, Why Giap did it: report from Saigon,'
Conflict Studies, Oct.1972, No.27.
13) p.150, Starry, D.A., Armored Combat in Vietnam.
14) p.71, ibid.
15) ibid.
16) p.39., Dunstan, S., Vietnam Tracks.
17) p.27, Starry, D.A., Armored Combat in Vietnam.
18 pp.150-153, ibid; p.286, Stanton, S., Rise and Fall of an American Army.
19) pp.250-275, Hopkins, R.N., Australia Armor: A History of the Royal Australian
Armored Corps, 1927-1972.
20) p.203, Starry, D.A., Armored Combat in Vietnam.
21) p.210, Ibid.
22) Stacey makes use of five works by VPA officers which have been translated and
published in English. They are: Senior Colonel Doan Ba Khanh, `The Advances Made in the
Combat Operations of the People's Navy in the General Offensive and Uprising of the Spring
of 1975,' Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan, Hanoi, No.11, Nov. 1976, in U.S. JPRS, Translations
on Vietnam, No.1906, 28 March 1977; Colonel Pham Quong, `In the General Offensive and
Uprising in the Spring of 1975: Some Experiences in Assuring the Mobility of the Military
Engineering Forces', Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan, Hanoi, No.12, Dec. 1976, in U.S. JPRS,
Translations on Vietnam, No. 1920, 28 Apr 1977; Major General Than Tho, `In the General
Offensive and Uprising of the Spring of 1975: Some Successful Lessons of the Rear-Service
Task', Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan, Hanoi, No.10, Oct.1976, in U.S. JPRS, Translations on
Vietnam, No. 1885, 2 Feb. 1977; General Van Tien Dung, Our Great Summer Victory: An
Account of the Liberation of South Vietnam, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1977; Colonel
Dao Van Xuan, `In the Spring General Offensive and Uprising-Tank-Armored Troops in
Strategic Group Offensives,' Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan, Hanoi, June 1976, in in U.S. JPRS,
Translations on Vietnam, No. 1839.
23) p.43, Stacey, K., 'Armor in Vietnam: the lessons of 1972 and 1975,' Australian
Defense Force Journal, May/June 1980, No.22.
24) Ulmer, W.F., `Notes on Enemy Armor at An Loc,' Armor, Jan- Feb.1973.
25) p.4, Ward, I., `North Vietnam's Blitzkrieg, Why Giap did it: report from Saigon,'
Conflict Studies, Oct.1972, No.27.
26) p.15, Ulmer, W.F., `Notes on Enemy Armor at An Loc,' Armor, Jan-Feb.1973.
27) p.45, Stacey, K., 'Armor in Vietnam: the lessons of 1972 and 1975,' Australian
Defense Force Journal, May/June 1980, No.22.
28) ibid.
29) ibid.
30) ibid.
31) Colonel Dao Van Xuan, `In the Spring General Offensive and Uprising-Tank-Armored
Troops in Strategic Group Offensives,' Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan, Hanoi, June 1976, in in
U.S. JPRS, Translations on Vietnam, No. 1839, quoted p.47, in Stacey, K., 'Armor in
Vietnam: the lessons of 1972 and 1975,' Australian Defense Force Journal, May/June 1980,
No.22.
32) p.48, loc.sit.
"There can be no more melancholy, nor in the last result, no more degrading
spectacle on earth than the spectacle of oppression, or of wrong in whatever form,
inflicted by the deliberate act of a nation upon another nation." Gladstone
